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I. | THE POLITICAL OBJECT AND EFFECT OF THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN | 9 | |
II. | THE PRELIMINARIES: NAPOLEON’S ADVANCE ACROSS THE SAMBRE | 24 | |
III. | THE DECISIVE DAY: FRIDAY, THE 16TH OF JUNE— | ||
LIGNY | 63 | ||
QUATRE-BRAS | 84 | ||
IV. | THE ALLIED RETREAT AND FRENCH ADVANCE UPON WATERLOO AND WAVRE | 129 | |
V. | THE ACTION | 158 |
It must continually be insisted upon in military history, that generalactions, however decisive, are but the functions of campaigns; and thatcampaigns, in their turn, are but the functions of the political energiesof the governments whose armies are engaged.
The object of a campaign is invariably a political object, and all itsmilitary effort is, or should be, subsidiary to that political object.
One human community desires to impose upon the future a politicalcondition which another human community rejects; or each is attempting toimpose upon the future, conditions irreconcilable one with the other.[Pg 10]Until we know what those conditions are, or what is the politicalobjective of each opponent, we cannot decide upon the success of acampaign, nor give it its true position in history.
Thus, to take the simplest and crudest case, a nation or its governmentdetermines to annex the territory of a neighbour; that is, to subject aneighbouring community to the laws of the conqueror. That neighbouringcommunity and its government, if they are so old-fashioned as to preferfreedom, will resist by force of arms, and there will follow what iscalled a “campaign” (a term derived from the French, and signifying a